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Abstract—Distributed algorithms for multi-agent resource al-
location can provide privacy and scalability over centralized
algorithms in many cyber-physical systems. However, the dis-
tributed nature of these algorithms can render these systems
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks that can lead to non-
convergence and infeasibility of resource allocation schemes. In
this paper, we propose attack-resilient distributed algorithms
based on primal-dual optimization when Byzantine attackers are
present in the system. In particular, we design attack-resilient
primal-dual algorithms for static and dynamic impersonation
attacks by means of robust statistics. For static impersonation
attacks, we formulate a robustified optimization model and show
that our algorithm guarantees convergence to a neighborhood
of the optimal solution of the robustified problem. On the other
hand, a robust optimization model is not required for the dynamic
impersonation attack scenario and we are able to design an
algorithm that is shown to converge to a near-optimal solution
of the original problem. We analyze the performances of our
algorithms through both theoretical and computational studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of multi-agent optimization problems arise in a
wide range of resource allocation systems that fall under the
general umbrella of Network Utility Maximization problems: in
the pioneering example of congestion control in data networks
[1], [2]; in determining the optimal price of electricity and
enabling more efficient demand supply balancing in smart
power distribution systems [3], [4]; in managing user trans-
mit powers and data rates in wireless cellular networks [5];
in determining optimal caching policies by content delivery
networks [6]; in optimizing power consumption in wireless
sensor networks with energy-restricted batteries [7], [8]; and in
designing congestion control systems in urban traffic networks
[9]. The shared goal among the above-mentioned problems is
to minimize the sum of N user-specific cost functions, subject
to a set of coupling constraints that depend on users’ decisions.
In these resource allocation problems, the user-specific cost
functions and the set of coupling constraints are considered
private information to the users and to a central coordinator,
respectively. Consequently, it is necessary to solve these
problems in a distributed fashion allowing the agents to
cooperate through communication with a central coordinator.
Among others, primal-dual optimization methods [10] have
been advocated as they naturally give rise to decomposable
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algorithms that favor distributed implementation [11]. In ad-
dition to their practical success, these methods are supported
by strong theoretical guarantees where fast convergence to a
near-optimal solution is well established [10].
However, the distributed nature of these methods also ex-
poses the system to vulnerabilities not faced by their traditional
centralized counterpart. Many of the existing algorithms as-
sume the agents, and the communication channels between
the central coordinator and the agents, to be completely
trustworthy. In this paper, we consider the setting where these
communications are susceptible to adversarial attacks. An
attacker can take over network sub-systems, and deliberately
edit the messages communicated to the central coordinator
to any arbitrary value, i.e., a Byzantine attack. As we will
demonstrate, this might result in an unstable system with
possible damages to hardware and the system overall.
Our goal is to design attack-resilient primal-dual algorithms
in order to solve multi-agent resource allocation problems in
presence of Byzantine attackers. If a communication channel
is attacked and becomes compromised, the attacker can modify
messages and/or inject fresh messages into the network on the
agents’ behalf. We consider two scenarios with different at-
tacker capabilities. A static impersonation attack scenario con-
siders the set of agents communicating through compromised
channels to be the same for the duration of the algorithm,
whereas a dynamic impersonation attack scenario considers
the case where all agents are susceptible to attacks and hence
communicate through compromised channels for a limited
fraction of the algorithm’s runtime. Our main contributions
are as follows:
• We propose resilient distributed resource allocation algo-
rithms under the two aforementioned attack scenarios that
rely on robust mean estimation.
• We provide convergence guarantees of the proposed algo-
rithms. We show that our algorithm for the dynamic imper-
sonation attack scenario converges to the optimal solution
of the regularized problem, while our algorithm for the
static impersonation attack scenario converges to an O(α21)
neighborhood of the optimal solution of a robustified and
regularized optimization model, where α1 ∈ [0, 12 ) is a
known upper bound on fraction of attacked channels.
• We provide empirical evidence that supports our theoretical
results on convergence and preventing constraint violation.
We do so via computational simulations on electric vehicle
charging and power distribution applications.
Related work: Vulnerabilities of various types of distributed
algorithms have been identified and addressed in a number
of recent studies. Relevant examples can be found in [12]–
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2[20] which study secure decentralized algorithms on a general
network topology but consider consensus-based optimization
models. There are two fundamental differences between dis-
tributed resource allocation and consensus problems that make
these algorithms inapplicable in our case:
• In resource allocation problems, each agent is solving
for their own optimal level of resource consumption, i.e.,
each agent is solving for their own parameter, whereas
consensus problems focus on all agents solving for a
shared (global) parameter.
• Unlike resilient consensus algorithms, in resource alloca-
tion problems pertaining to access to critical infrastruc-
ture systems such as power or transportation networks,
one cannot simply block a set of users’ access to the
network even if they are deemed likely to be attackers.
A recently popular line of works in [21]–[25] focuses on build-
ing resilient algorithms for distributed statistical learning. A
crucial difference from this work is that they assume identical
functions across the agents. In fact, we employ robust statistics
[26], [27] to develop our resilient algorithms, and particularly,
we develop novel results for robust mean estimation, a topic
that is recently rekindled in [28]–[30].
The present paper is a revised and extended version of the
preliminary conference report [31]. This paper expands [31]
into multiple attack scenarios and includes numerical studies.
Paper Organization: The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section II, we provide an overview of the
basic primal-dual algorithm for resource allocation. In Sec-
tion III, we formally define two Byzantine attack models and
demonstrate how Byzantine attacks can alter the primal-dual
optimization procedure. In Section IV, we present two attack-
resilient primal-dual algorithms corresponding to the different
attack scenarios along with their convergence analysis. In
Section V, we provide numerical results for our algorithms.
Notations. Unless otherwise specified, ‖ · ‖ denotes the stan-
dard Euclidean norm. For any N ∈ N, [N ] denotes the finite
set {1, ..., N}. Given θ, θi indicates the i’th block/entry of θ
that corresponds to the parameter of agent i. θi,j denotes the
j’th element of vector θi.
II. OVERVIEW OF PRIMAL-DUAL ALGORITHM FOR
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
We consider the following multi-agent optimization problem
with an objective to minimize the average cost incurred by the
agents, subject to a set of constraints that are functions of the
average of the agents’ parameters:
min
θi∈Rd,∀i
f(θ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(θi)
subject to gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
)
≤ 0, t = 1, . . . , T,
θi ∈ Ci, i = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
where fi(·) : Rd → R is the continuously differentiable and
convex cost function of agent i and gt(·) : Rd → R are
continuously differentiable and convex set of constraints. The
parameter θi of agent i is constrained to be in a compact
convex set Ci ∈ Rd.
Algorithm 1: PD-DRA Procedure.
1: for k = 1, 2, ... do
2: (Communication stage):
(a) Central coordinator receives {θ(k)i }Ni=1 from
agents and computes θ
(k)
:= 1N
∑N
i=1 θ
(k)
i ,
{∇θgt(θ(k))}Tt=1.
(b) Central coordinator broadcasts the vector
g(k) :=
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ
(k)
) to agents.
3: (Computation stage):
(a) Agent i computes the update for θ(k+1)i
according to (4a) using the received g(k).
(b) The central coordinator computes the update for
λ(k+1) according to (4b).
4: end for
Running Example (Resource Allocation Problem). Through-
out the paper, we use the following toy example as a running
example to clarify the concepts and the methods: We consider
an EV charging example with 5 agents. The cost function fi(·)
is monotone decreasing and is the same for all agents. As an
example, we set fi(θi) = (θi − 10)2 as the quadratic cost
function which is monotonically decreasing for 0 ≤ θi ≤ 10.
There is a charging station with 5 EV charging points, three
of which have a maximum charging rate of 7kW, and two have
a rate of 10kW. The total rate at which the charging station is
able to deliver electricity is determined by the grid, and let it
be upper bounded by 25kW (hence, the average rate is upper
bounded by 255 = 5kW). Accordingly, the constraints of this
system are stated as:
g
(
(1/5)
∑5
i=1 θi
)
:= (1/5)
∑5
i=1 θi − 5 ≤ 0,
0 ≤ θi ≤ 7, i = 1, 2, 3,
0 ≤ θi ≤ 10, i = 4, 5.
Note that θ is a real number, hence dimension d = 1. The
optimal solution in this example is to deliver electricity at a
rate of 5kW to all agents due to symmetry.
The optimization problem in (1) can not be solved centrally,
because the utility functions fi(·) are private to the agents,
and furthermore the coupling constraints on the resources are
only known by a central coordinator. Accordingly, the goal
of the primal-dual distributed resource allocation (PD-DRA)
procedure in Algorithm 1 is to solve (1) in a distributed
manner, where the agents observe a pricing signal received
from the central coordinator and communicate their parameters
to the central coordinator [10]. Consequent to this information
exchange, the pricing signal and the agents’ parameters are
updated by the central coordinator and by the individual
agents, respectively.
In order to derive the update rules used by Algorithm 1, we
first consider the Lagrangian function of (1):
L({θi}Ni=1;λ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(θi) +
T∑
t=1
λt gt
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
θi
)
, (2)
where λt ≥ 0 is the dual variable associated with constraint
gt(·) and λ = [λ1 . . . λT ]ᵀ ∈ RT+ is the vector of the
dual variables. Under strong duality (e.g., when the Slater’s
3condition holds), solving problem (1) is equivalent to solving
its dual problem:
max
λ∈RT+
min
θi∈Ci,∀i
L({θi}Ni=1;λ). (P)
As suggested in [10], we consider a regularized version of (P).
Let us define
Lυ({θi}Ni=1;λ) :=
L({θi}Ni=1;λ) + υ2N
∑N
i=1 ‖θi‖2 − υ2 ‖λ‖2,
(3)
such that Lυ(·) is υ-strongly convex and υ-strongly concave
in {θi}Ni=1 and λ, respectively.
Remark 1. Adding regularization terms is a typical technique
used in optimization, called dual smoothing [32]. We add
the regularization terms for the purposes of convergence
analysis used in this paper, which can be applied on strongly
convex/concave functions. Indeed adding the regularization
terms might change the solution of the original optimization
problem. However, as explained in [33, Proposition 5.2], by an
appropriate selection of the regularization parameters, we can
recover an optimality gap guarantee for the original problem
based on the solution to the regularized problem.
We define the regularized problem as:
max
λ∈RT+
min
θi∈Ci,∀i
Lυ({θi}Ni=1;λ). (Pυ)
Let γ > 0 be the step size and k ∈ Z+ be the iteration
index. The primal-dual recursion performs projected gradient
descent/ascent on the primal/dual variables as follows:
θ
(k+1)
i = (4a)
PCi
(
θ
(k)
i − γ∇θiLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k))
)
, ∀i ∈ [N ],
λ(k+1) =
[
λ(k) + γ∇λLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k))
]
+
, (4b)
where PCi(·) is the Euclidean projection operator to set Ci
and [·]+ denotes max{·, 0} operator. According to (3), the
gradients with respect to (w.r.t.) the primal and the dual
variables are given respectively by:
∇θiLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k)) =
1
N
(
∇θifi(θ(k)i ) + υ θ(k)i
+
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ)
∣∣∣
θ= 1N
∑N
i=1 θ
(k)
i
)
,
(5a)
[∇λLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k))]t = gt( 1N ∑Ni=1θ(k)i )− υ λ(k)t ,
(5b)
for all i, t. It is worthwhile to highlight that both gradients
depend on the average parameter θ
(k)
:= 1N
∑N
i=1 θ
(k)
i . From
the above equations (5a) and (5b), we can determine which
variables should be communicated between the central coor-
dinator and the agents so that the gradients can be computed
locally, see Algorithm 1.
Since the regularized primal-dual problem is strongly con-
vex/concave in primal/dual variables, Algorithm 1 converges
linearly to the optimal solution of (Pυ) [10]. To study this, let
us concatenate the primal and the dual variables and denote
z(k) := ({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k)) as the primal-dual variable at the
kth iteration and define the mapping Φ(z(k)) as:
Φ(z(k)) :=
(
∇θLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k))
−∇λLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k))
)
. (6)
Proposition 1. [10, Theorem 3.5] Assume that the map
Φ(z(k)) is LΦ Lipschitz continuous. For all k ≥ 1, we have
‖z(k+1) − z?‖2 ≤ (1− 2γυ + γ2L2Φ) ‖z(k) − z?‖2, (7)
where z? is a saddle point to the (Pυ). Setting γ = υ/L2Φ
gives ‖z(k+1) − z?‖2 ≤ (1− υ2/L2Φ)‖z(k) − z?‖2, ∀ k ≥ 1.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Even though the PD-DRA provides strong theoretical con-
vergence guarantee, it relies on error-free communication
between the central coordinator and the agents, and is not
robust to attacks on the channels between the agents and the
central coordinator, as described below.
We study a situation when the uplink communication chan-
nels between some of the agents and the central coordinator are
compromised.1 Let A(k) ⊂ [N ] be the set of agents commu-
nicating through compromised uplink channels at iteration k,
whose identities are unknown to the central coordinator, and
let H(k) := [N ] \ A(k) be the set of agents communicating
through trustworthy uplink channels at iteration k. Instead
of receiving θ(k)i from each agent i ∈ [N ] at iteration k
(Algorithm 1 Step 2(a)), the central coordinator receives the
following messages:
r
(k)
i =
{
θ
(k)
i , if i ∈ H(k),
b
(k)
i , if i ∈ A(k).
(8)
We consider a Byzantine attack scenario, under which the
messages sent through the compromised channels, b(k)i , can
be chosen arbitrarily by an adversary. This also encompasses
faulty messages due to erroneous inputs or erroneous channels,
since we set no restrictions on b(k)i . The adversary’s goal
is to harm the system and cause suboptimalities. When the
messages are erroneous or chosen adversarily, the central coor-
dinator computes the gradients and therefore the pricing signal
using these erroneous messages. The agents then update their
parameters based on this erroneous pricing signal, which can
lead to an overall suboptimal resource allocation. Moreover,
the choice of the compromised channels A(k) affects the
impact of the attack and the precautions to be taken in order
to defend against the attack. As such, we study two Byzantine
attack scenarios that differ in the set of the compromised
channels as illustrated in Figure 1.
Running Example (Byzantine Attack). Let agent 1 be com-
municating through a compromised channel at all iterations,
i.e., A(k) = {1}, ∀k. The compromised message sent to
the central coordinator is b(k)1 = 1kW, ∀k. This means that
irrespective of θ(k)1 , the central coordinator receives a message
indicating agent 1 is willing to charge at rate of 1kW.
1This paper studies the case where only uplink channels are compromised.
However, the case of downlink corruption can also be addressed. Since the
downlink channel is a broadcast channel, a compromised downlink channel
results in no agent receiving a trustworthy pricing signal. In that case, there
is no optimization method based solution to that problem since there is no
communication. If we assume however that all the downlink channels are
point-to-point between the central coordinator and each agent, the methods
developed in this paper can be applied in a similar fashion.
4(a) A static impersonation attack scenario, agents 4 and 5 are permanently communicating through compromised channels.
(b) A dynamic impersonation scenario, where the set of agents communicating through compromised channels are changing.
Fig. 1: Illustration of (a) static impersonation attack, and (b) dynamic impersonation attack. Blue arrows represent trustworthy channels, whereas red arrows
represent compromised channels.
A. Attack scenarios
1) A static impersonation attack, where an adversary takes
over a subset of uplink channels permanently and the set of
agents communicating through compromised channels is fixed
(i.e., A(k) = A, ∀k). Consequently, the central coordinator is
never able to communicate reliably with agents i ∈ A. In
this case, it is not feasible to optimize the original problem
(P) since the contribution from f(θi) : i ∈ A becomes
unknown to the central coordinator. Yet, we assume that it is
also not possible to deny access to resources to agents who are
suspected of potentially being under attack. As a compromise,
we formulate the following optimization problem:
min
θi∈Ci,i∈H
f(θ) :=
1
N
∑
i∈H
fi(θi)
subject to max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
)
≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [T ].
(9)
The objective of (9) is to minimize the cost of the agents
with trustworthy channels subject to a robust set of constraints
that consider the worst case scenario, in which the parameters
of the agents with compromised channels are assumed to be
maximizing the constraints (e.g., those agents are assumed
to be consuming the maximum amount of resources). It is
critical to mention that during a primal-dual algorithm scheme,
the messages received through the compromised channels
can be anything. The robust approach is to however ignore
those messages, and assume that the parameters of the agents
communicating through those channels are maximizing the
constraints so that the operation of the system is feasible under
any circumstance. Our goal is to develop an attack-resilient
PD-DRA to solve the robust optimization problem (9).
Running Example (Robust Optimization Model). Since agent
1 is sending a compromised message of 1kW and their true
parameter can be anything, the worst-case approach is to
assume that they are charging at the maximum rate, which
is 7kW for that agent. Hence, the robust constraint is:
max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
g
(
1
5
5∑
i=1
θi
)
= max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
1
5
5∑
i=1
θi − 5
=
1
5
∑
i∈H
θi + max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
1
5
∑
j∈A
θj − 5 = 4
5
θH − 3.6,
where we used |H| = 4 and the notation θH = 1|H|
∑
i∈H θi.
The robust constraint states that:
4
5
θH − 3.6 ≤ 0⇒ θH ≤ 4.5.
The optimal solution in this case is to deliver electricity at a
rate of 4.5kW to the trustworthy agents. Since the compromised
agent has the same cost function, their true charging rate will
also be 4.5kW, even though the message sent is 1kW and the
central coordinator assumes their charging rate is 7kW.
2) A dynamic impersonation attack, where all the agents
might be affected by the adversarial attacks but only for a
limited fraction of time and hence, the set of agents communi-
cating through compromised channels A(k) has to dynamically
change with iteration k. As opposed to the static case, this
scenario considers the case where the central coordinator is
able to communicate reliably with all the agents at some
iterations. Due to this distinction, it is necessary to mention
that the static attack is not a special case of the dynamic
attack and both scenarios are distinguishable from each other.
The dynamic scenario could be applicable when agents do
not have dedicated communication channels to the central
coordinator and instead communicate over random access sys-
tems which are more appropriate for distributed deployments.
Hence, each user periodically accesses authenticated network
devices/subsystems that are controlled by Byzantine adver-
saries and can alter the user’s message. Our goal is to develop
an attack-resilient PD-DRA algorithm that can still solve the
original regularized problem (Pυ) in this environment.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of basic PD-DRA algorithm failure under static imperson-
ation attack. (a) The agents’ parameters do not converge, (b) the objective
function does not converge and moreover there is constraint violation. We
only display one constraint for brevity.
B. Limitations of the Basic PD-DRA Algorithm
Applying the basic PD-DRA algorithm under a Byzantine
attack scenario can lead to undesirable outcomes. Recall that
the gradients in (5) depend on the average parameter θ
(k)
.
Under a Byzantine attack scenario, if the central coordinator
forms the naive average θ˜(k) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 r
(k)
i and com-
putes the gradients ∇gt(θ˜(k)) accordingly, this may result in
large error since the deviation θ˜(k)− (1/N)∑Ni=1 θ(k)i can be
large (proportional to the maximum diameter of Ci’s). This in
turn can obstruct convergence and also overload the system
by causing constraint violations.
Running Example (Basic PD-DRA Failure). If the central
coordinator believes all the agents are sending trustworthy
information, then the optimal solution will occur when one
agent is demanding 1kW and the others are demanding 6kW
(so that the average is 5kW). But since the 1kW message is
compromised and all the agents have same cost function, the
compromised agent’s true electricity demand is also at a rate
of 6kW. Hence, the solution delivers electricity at an average
rate of 6kW, which is infeasible.
We preview our numerical result of applying the basic PD-
DRA method under a static impersonation attack scenario
for an optimal electric vehicle charging application in Fig-
ure 2. For constraint gt(·), we define constraint violation as
max{0, gt(θ(k))}. Observe that the PD-DRA method does not
provide convergence and the first constraint is being violated.
From resource allocation perspective, this means that the
agents are asking to consume more resources than the available
amount in the system, which is infeasible. For details regarding
the experimental setup, please see Section V.
IV. RESILIENT PD-DRA ALGORITHMS
Motivated by the failure of the basic PD-DRA procedure un-
der Byzantine attack scenarios, resilient PD-DRA algorithms
are necessary to optimize multi-agent systems in a distributed
manner when the system is susceptible to attacks. We hold
the following assumption to be true throughout the rest of
the paper and propose two different attack resilient PD-DRA
algorithms corresponding to the different attack scenarios
outlined in Section III.
Assumption 1. For all θ ∈ Rd and for all t, the gradient of gt
is bounded with ‖∇gt(θ)‖ ≤ B and is L-Lipschitz continuous.
Moreover, since maximum resource that can be consumed by
an agent is bounded due to limited amount of resources, we
let 0 ∈ Ci and upper bound the diameters of Ci by R:
max
θ,θ′∈Ci
‖θ − θ′‖ ≤ R, i = 1, ..., N. (10)
Running Example (Assumptions). The constraint in our
running example satisfies ∇g(θ) = 1, which is bounded by
B = 1 and is L = 0-Lipschitz continuous. Since the maximum
charging rate is upper bounded by 7kW for three of the agents
and by 10kW for two of the agents, R = 10.
A. Static Impersonation Attack
Under this attack scenario, given the complete lack of any
credible information on the resource consumption parameters
of the agents that permanently communicate through com-
promised channels, the central coordinator can only hope to
solve the robust optimization model defined in (9) instead. This
formulation considers a worst-case scenario on how much re-
sources the compromised agents will consume, which ensures
constraint satisfaction in all cases. However, the constraints in
(9) require the knowledge of the set A and the sets Cj ,∀j ∈ A,
yet the central coordinator lacks this information.
Hence, in order to develop a robust optimization model that
can handle the worst-case scenario without the knowledge
of A, we let α1 ≥ |A|/N as a known upper bound to
the fraction of agents communicating through compromised
channels and assume α1 < 1/2, where less than half of the
agents are communicating through compromised channels.2
Let θH := 1|H|
∑
i∈H θi be the mean of the agent’s parameters
that are sent through trustworthy channels. We then define the
following set of constraints
gt(θ) := gt(θ) + α1
(
RB + 12LR
2
)
, (11)
and formulate a conservative approximation of (9):
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1 the following problem yields
a conservative approximation of (9), i.e., its feasible set is a
subset of the feasible set of (9):
min
θi∈Ci,i∈H
1
N
∑
i∈H
fi(θi)
subject to gt
(
(1− α1)θH
) ≤ 0, ∀ t ∈ [T ], (12)
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Remark 2. The proof of Lemma 1 is done by upper bounding
constraints of (9) using Assumption 1 and the fact that
α1 ≥ |A|/N . The looser these upper bounds compared to
the true values, the more conservative is (12). This approach
potentially leaves less resources available to the agents com-
municating through trustworthy channels by assuming more
than |A| number of agents having maximum possible impact
2If more than half of the agents communicate through compromised
channels, then the adversary controls the majority and therefore the median,
which will be used to estimate the average parameter later in the paper. In
that case, there is no optimization based solution the central coordinator can
implement in order to securely run the system.
6on the constraints, irrespective of their set Ci or the true
value/gradient of the constraints.
Running Example (Conservative Approximation). With
B = 1, L = 0, and R = 10, the conservative approximation
of the running example has the following constraint:
g((1− α1)θH) = g((1− α1)θH) + α1(RB + 1
2
LR2)
= (1− α1)θH − 5 + 10α1
If α1 = |A|/N = 0.2, then the upper bound is the fraction of
compromised channels. In that case, the constraint is:
0.8θH − 3 ≤ 0⇔ θH ≤ 3.75,
which is more conservative compared to the constraint of the
robust optimization model (which was θH ≤ 4.5). The optimal
solution in this case is to deliver electricity at a rate of 3.75kW
to the agents. The conservatism arises due to the difference
between agent-specific maximum charging rate 7kW and the
absolute maximum charging rate 10kW. Since the constraint
is linear, the gradient is constant. Hence, the smoothness and
Lipschitz bounds hold with equality without causing additional
conservatism.
If however α1 = 0.4, then the central coordinator assumes
two agents communicating through compromised channels. In
this case the conservative approximation has the constraint as
0.6θH − 1 ≤ 0⇔ θH ≤ 5
3
,
which results in charging at an even slower rate since the
central coordinator has to be robust against two agents
charging at the maximum rate of 10kW.
To develop an attack resilient PD-DRA algorithm, we again
define the regularized Lagrangian function of (12):
Lυ({θi}i∈H;λ;H)
:= 1N
∑
i∈Hfi(θi) +
∑T
t=1λt gt
(
(1− α1)θH
)
+ υ2N
∑
i∈H ‖θi‖2 − υ2 ‖λ‖2.
(13)
The above function is (1−α1)υ-strongly convex and concave
in θ and λ, respectively (since (1−α1) ≤ |H|N ≤ 1). Our main
task is to tackle the following modified problem of (P) under
Byzantine attack on (some of) the uplinks:
max
λ∈RT+
min
θi∈Ci,∀i∈H
Lυ({θi}i∈H;λ;H). (P′υ)
Notice that (P′υ) bears a similar form as (P) and thus one may
apply the PD-DRA method to the former. The gradients with
respect to primal/dual variables are given by:
∇θiLυ({θ(k)i }i∈H;λ(k);H) =
1
N
(
∇θifi(θ(k)i ) + υ θ(k)i ,
+ (1−α1)N|H|
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ)
∣∣∣
θ=(1−α1)θ¯(k)H
)
,∀i ∈ H,
(14a)[∇λLυ({θ(k)i }i∈H;λ(k);H)]t = gt((1− α1)θ(k)H )− υλ(k)t .
(14b)
However, such application requires the central coordinator to
compute the sample average
θ
(k)
H =
1
|H|
∑
i∈H θ
(k)
i , (15)
Algorithm 2: Robust PD-DRA Algorithm
1: Input: Each agent has initial state θ(0)i .
2: for k = 1, 2, ... do
3: (At the Central Coordinator):
(a) Receives {r(k)i }Ni=1, see (8), from agents.
(b) Computes robust mean θ̂(k)H using the estimator
(16).
(c) Broadcasts the vector
ĝ
(k)
H :=
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt((1− α1)θ̂(k)H ) to agents.
(d) Computes the update for λ(k+1) with (18b).
4: (At each agent i∈ H):
(a) Agent receives ĝ(k)H .
(b) Agent computes update for θ(k+1)i with (18a).
5: end for
at each iteration. The above might not be computationally
feasible under the attack model, since the central coordinator
is oblivious to the identity of H. As a solution, the central
coordinator computes the robust mean θ̂(k)H of the received
parameters {r(k)i }i∈[N ] using a median-based mean estimator
described next.
1) Overview of Median-Based Mean Estimation: Consider
a set of N vectors {xi ∈ Rd}Ni=1, among which at least
(1 − α1)N are trustworthy (xi ∈ H) and at most α1N are
compromised (xi ∈ A). We consider a simple median-based
estimator applied to each coordinate j = 1, . . . , d. First, define
the coordinate-wise median as:
[xmed]j = med
({[xi]j}Ni=1) ,
where med(·) computes the median of the operand. Then, our
estimator is computed as the mean of the nearest (1− α1)N
neighbors of [xmed]j . Our estimator is:
[x̂H]j = 1(1−α1)N
∑
i∈Nj [xi]j , (16)
where we have defined the set with |Nj | = (1− α1)N as:
Nj = {i ∈ [N ] :
∣∣[xi − xmed]j∣∣ ≤ rj},
such that rj is chosen to satisfy |Nj | = (1− α1)N .
The following bounds the performance of (16):
Proposition 2. Let xH be the mean of the trustworthy vec-
tors. Suppose that maxi∈H ‖xi − xH‖∞ ≤ r, then for any
α1 ∈ (0, 12 ), it holds that:
‖x̂H − xH‖ ≤ 2α1
1− α1
1 +√ (1− α1)2
1− 2α1
 r√d. (17)
The proof can be found in Appendix B. We note that
for sufficiently small α1, the right hand side on (17) can
be approximated by O(α1r
√
d). Using this median-based
mean estimator, we propose the robust PD-DRA algorithm
as follows.
2) Robust PD-DRA Algorithm: We summarize the static
impersonation attack resilient PD-DRA method in Algo-
rithm 2. The algorithm behaves similarly as Algorithm 1
applied to (P′υ), with the exception that the central coordinator
is oblivious to H, and it uses a robust mean estimator to
find an approximate average for the signals sent through the
7Fig. 3: Robust mean estimation under static impersonation attack. Red/blue
circles correspond to parameters received through compromised/trustworthy
channels, respectively. In this example, there are N = 5 agents and agents 1
and 2 are always communicating through compromised channels. At iteration
k, the central coordinator computes the robust mean θ̂(k)H of the received
parameters {r(k)i }i∈[N ].
trustworthy links, as illustrated in Figure 3. This approximate
value is used to compute the new price signals, and sent back
to agents. In particular, the primal-dual updates are:
θ
(k+1)
i = PCi
(
θ
(k)
i − γN
(
ĝ
(k)
H +∇θifi(θ(k)i ) + υθ(k)i
))
, (18a)
λ
(k+1)
t =
[
λ
(k)
t + γ
(
gt((1− α1)θ̂(k)H )− υλ(k)t
)]
+
. (18b)
We note that the update rule in (18a) is valid for agents in set
H, because the gradients of the Lagrangian are defined only
for those agents in (14a). The agents in set A may or may
not use the same update rule, however, this does not have any
impact on the algorithm as they can never communicate their
true parameters to the central coordinator.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 2 is a primal-dual algorithm [10] for
(P′υ) with perturbed gradients:
ĝ
(k)
θ = ∇θLυ(θ(k);λ(k);H) + e(k)θ , (19a)
ĝ
(k)
λ = ∇λLυ(θ(k);λ(k);H) + e(k)λ , (19b)
where we have used concatenated variable as θ = ({θi}i∈H).
Under Assumption 1 and assuming that λ(k)t ≤ λ for all k,
we have:
‖e(k)θ ‖ ≤(1− α1)λLT‖θ̂(k)H − θ
(k)
H ‖
+
|H| − (1− α1)N
|H| λBT,
(20)
‖e(k)λ ‖ ≤ (1− α1)BT‖θ̂(k)H − θ
(k)
H ‖. (21)
The proof can be found in Appendix C. The assumption
λ
(k)
t ≤ λ can be guaranteed since gt((1−α1)θ̂(k)H ) is bounded,
which is proven in Appendix H. Furthermore, the performance
analysis for the median based estimator shows that
‖θ̂(k)H − θ
(k)
H ‖ = O(α1R
√
d) (22)
when α1 is small. Finally, based on Lemma 2, we can analyze
the convergence of Algorithm 2. Let ẑ? = (θ̂?, λ̂?) be a saddle
point of (P′υ) and define
Φ(z(k)) :=
(
∇θLυ({θ(k)i }i∈H,λ(k);H)
−∇λLυ({θ(k)i }i∈H,λ(k);H)
)
. (23)
We are ready to present our main result for static attacks.
Theorem 1. Assume the map Φ(z(k)) is LΦ-Lipschitz contin-
uous. For Algorithm 2, for all k ≥ 0 it holds:
‖z(k+1) − ẑ?‖2 ≤(1− γυ′ + 2γ2L2Φ)‖z(k) − ẑ?‖2
+
(
4γ
υ′
+ 2γ2
)
Ek.
(24)
where υ′ := (1 − α1)υ and Ek := ‖e(k)θ ‖2 + ‖e(k)λ ‖2 is
the total perturbation at iteration k. Moreover, if we choose
γ < υ′/2L2Φ and Ek is upper bounded by E for all k, then
lim sup
k→∞
‖z(k) − ẑ?‖2 ≤
4
υ′ + 2γ
υ′ − 2γL2Φ
E. (25)
The proof can be found in Appendix D. Combining with
(22) shows that the resilient PD-DRA method converges to a
O(α21R2d) neighborhood of the saddle point of (P′υ). More-
over, it shows that the convergence rate to the neighborhood
is linear, which is similar to the classical analysis in [10].
B. Dynamic Impersonation Attack
Under this attack scenario, the set of agents communicat-
ing through compromised channels is dynamically changing
with iterations. We make the following assumption on how
frequently each agent’s communications are compromised:
Assumption 2. Let m be a fixed window size and α2 < 0.5 be
a known upper bound on how frequent an agent communicates
through a compromised channel. Then, for all k ≥ m − 1
and for all agents i ∈ [N ], among the received parameters
{r(k−`)i }m−1`=0 at most α2m are sent through compromised
channels.
It is important to recall that the dynamic attack scenario
does not generalize the static attack scenario and there is
a significant distinction between the two. The static attack
scenario assumes that a fixed set of agents’ communications
are permanently compromised. It may occur when when the
attacker compromises set of communication channels and
those channels are assigned to the agents via a static channel
allocation scheme.
On the contrary, for the dynamic attack scenario, each user’s
communications are vulnerable to attacks for at most a given
α2 fraction of iterations over a window of size m under
Assumption 2, and hence each agent is able to communicate
reliably with the central coordinator at some iterations. This
scheme may occur when the attacker compromises a fixed
set of communication channels (same as the static scenario),
however, the channels are assigned to the agents via a dynamic
channel allocation scheme (e.g., do a round-robin channel
allocation. If there are m communication channels out of
which α2m are compromised, assigning channels dynamically
in a cyclic way to the agents ensures that over a window of m,
every agent has sent α2m compromised messages). Although
the attacker behaves the same way, we can simulate both sce-
narios by static/dynamic channel allocation. In cyber-physical
systems, such dynamic allocation schemes are commonly used
(e.g., dynamic IP assignment to be protected from hackers).
Interestingly, it is possible to develop an algorithm that con-
verges to the optimal solution of Problem (Pυ). The intuition
8Fig. 4: Robust mean estimation under dynamic impersonation attacks.
Red/blue circles correspond to parameters received through compro-
mised/trustworthy channels, respectively. In this example, there are N = 5
agents and the set of agents communicating through compromised channels
is changing at every iteration. At iteration k, the central coordinator computes
the robust mean θ̂(k)i of the received parameters {r(k−`)i }m−1`=0 for all agents
i ∈ [N ]. Then, computes the naive average of {θ̂(k)i }Ni=1 to get the average
parameter θ̂(k).
behind is that the received parameters over a long period of
time contain a fraction of trustworthy information that can
extracted by the algorithm to perform faithful computations.
Our algorithm is similar in nature to an averaging gradient
scheme where the primal-dual updates utilize the averages of
time delayed gradients. Furthermore, the scheme is combined
with the robust mean estimator developed in Sec. IV-A1 to
approximate the averages of outdated gradients, as illustrated
in Figure 4. Specifically, the central coordinator chooses a
window size of m. For any iteration k ≥ m − 1, instead of
using r(k)i for computing the average parameter θ
(k)
and the
gradients, the central coordinator computes the robust mean
θ̂
(k)
i from the received parameters {r(k−`)i }m−1`=0 using the
median-based mean estimator (16) for all agents i ∈ [N ],
applied on the sequence of historical received parameters. Note
that we have replaced α1 by α2, N by m in this application. It
then uses θ̂(k) := 1N
∑N
i=1 θ̂
(k)
i for computation of the primal-
dual updates.
We summarize our robust averaging PD-DRA method in
Algorithm 3. The primal-dual updates are described by:
θ
(k+1)
i = PCi
(
θ
(k)
i − γN
(
ĝ(k) +∇θifi(θ(k)i ) + υθ(k)i
))
, (26a)
λ
(k+1)
t =
[
λ
(k)
t + γ
(
gt(θ̂
(k))− υλ(k)t
)]
+
. (26b)
Lemma 3. Algorithm 3 is a primal-dual algorithm for (Pυ)
with perturbed gradients:
ĝ
(k)
θ = ∇θLυ(θ(k);λ(k)) + e(k)θ , (27a)
ĝ
(k)
λ = ∇λLυ(θ(k);λ(k)) + e(k)λ , (27b)
where we have used concatenated variable as θ = ({θi}i∈N ).
Under Assumption 1 and assuming that λ(k)t ≤ λ for all k, we
have:
‖e(k)θ ‖ ≤
λLT
N
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖, (28a)
‖e(k)λ ‖ ≤
BT
N
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖. (28b)
The proof can be found in Appendix E. The assumption
λ
(k)
t ≤ λ can be guaranteed since gt(θ̂(k)) is bounded, which
is proven in Appendix H. Let z(k) := ({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k)) be the
Algorithm 3: Averaging PD-DRA Algorithm
1: Input: Each agent has initial state θ(0)i .
2: for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 2 do
3: Apply basic PD-DRA (Run Algorithm 1).
4: end for
5: for k = m− 1,m, . . . do
6: (At the Central Coordinator):
(a) Receives {r(k)i }Ni=1, see (8), from agents.
(b) For all agents i = 1, . . . , N , computes robust
mean θ̂(k)i of {r(k−`)i }m−1`=0 using the estimator
(16) with parameters α1 → α2, N → m.
(c) Computes θ̂(k) := 1N
∑N
i=1 θ̂
(k)
i .
(d) Broadcasts the vector
ĝ(k) :=
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ̂(k)) to agents.
(e) Computes the update for λ(k+1) with (26b).
7: (At each agent i):
(a) Agent receives ĝ(k).
(b) Agent computes update for θ(k+1)i with (26a).
8: end for
primal-dual variable at the kth iteration and define the mapping
Φ(z(k)) as in (6). We observe that the algorithm’s behavior is
similar to the incremental aggregated gradient method in [35]–
[37]. The following Lemma, which is inspired by [35]–[37],
upper bounds the perturbation in the gradients in (28) by the
maximum optimality gap in a finite window of size 2m− 1:
Lemma 4. Assume the map Φ(z(k)) is LΦ-Lipschitz continu-
ous. Let Ek := ‖e(k)θ ‖2 +‖e(k)λ ‖2. Then, for all k ≥ 2(m−1)
we have:
Ek ≤ γ2C max
0≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖2, (29)
where
C =
(
T 2(λ
2
L2 +B2)
N
)
×
(
1
LΦ
+ (1 +
√
d)λLT
)2
×
(
1 + Cα
1− α2 + Cα
)2
× (m− 1)2,
(30)
and
Cα =
2α2
1− α2
1 +√ (1− α2)2
1− 2α2
√d.
The proof can be found in Appendix F. Using on Lemmas 3
and 4, we can analyze the converge of Algorithm 3:
Theorem 2. Assume the map Φ(z(k)) is LΦ-Lipschitz contin-
uous. For Algorithm 3, for all k ≥ 2(m− 1) it holds that:
‖z(k+1) − z?‖2 ≤ (1− γυ + 2γ2L2Φ)‖z(k) − z?‖2
+
(
4γ
υ
+ 2γ2
)
γ2C max
0≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖2. (31)
Moreover, if we choose γ sufficiently small such that it satisfies
υ − 2γL2Φ −
4Cγ2
υ
− 2Cγ3 > 0,
then:
‖z(k) − z?‖2 ≤ ρk−2(m−1)‖z(2(m−1)) − z?‖2, (32)
9and
lim
k→∞
‖z(k) − z?‖2 = 0, (33)
where ρ = (1− γυ + 2γ2L2Φ + 4Cγ
3
υ + 2Cγ
4)
1
1+2(m−1) .
The proof can be found in Appendix G. Theorem 2 shows
that the robust averaging PD-DRA method converges geomet-
rically to the optimal solution of (Pυ) under said assumptions.
C. Remarks
A few remarks highlighting design criteria to be explored
in practical implementations are in order:
• Theorem 1 illustrates a trade-off in the choice of the
step size γ between convergence speed and accuracy. In
particular, (24) shows that the rate of convergence factor
1−γυ+2γ2L2Φ can be minimized by setting γ = υ/(4L2Φ).
Meanwhile, the asymptotic upper bound in (25) is increas-
ing with γ and it can be minimized by setting γ → 0.
• Theorem 2 illustrates a trade-off between the window
size m and the convergence rate. Observe that increasing
the window size m decreases the rate of convergence
by increasing ρ (Equations (30) and (32)). On the other
hand, the likelihood that Assumption 2 holds true in a
stochastic setting (e.g., channels being compromised with
some probability) increases with a larger window size m.
• Under the dynamic impersonation attack scenario, the
choice of α2 does not affect convergence accuracy to the
saddle point of (Pυ), but only changes the convergence rate.
As such, choosing the largest α2 such that α2m = bm−12 c
(i.e., assuming maximum possible number of iterates re-
ceived through compromised channels) makes the algo-
rithm robustly applicable to all dynamic impersonation
attack scenarios regardless of the frequency of the attack.
• In case the central coordinator can not identify the attack
scenario as static or dynamic impersonation (or the attack
can be a mixture of both), a mixture of both Algorithms 2
and 3 can be applied. In particular, this can be done
by adding Step 6(b) of Algorithm 3 before Step 3(b) of
Algorithm 2, and applying the rest of the Algorithm 2 as it
is. The central coordinator first computes robust parameters
θ̂
(k)
i by computing the robust mean of {r(k−`)i }m−1`=0 for all
agents, and then computes the robust mean of {θ̂(k)i }Ni=1.
This effectively makes Algorithm 2 robust to possible
dynamic impersonation attacks on uplink channels that are
thought to be trustworthy for all iterations.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of our
methods and verify our theoretical claims by applying our
algorithms for: 1) an electric vehicle (EV) charging coordi-
nator under static impersonation attack, 2) an electric vehicle
charging coordinator under dynamic impersonation attack, and
3) a power distribution network with flexible demand under
dynamic impersonation attack. The EV charging coordina-
tor problem resembles classic network utility maximization
problems such as those studied in communication networks
whereas the power distribution network problem has more
nuisances that we will discuss next. To solve the convex
optimization problems in order to get the optimal solutions,
we used CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex
programs [38].
A. Electric Vehicle (EV) Charging Facility
In this study, the aim is to optimize EV charging demand
over time. We consider multiple EVs receiving charge under
the same local feeder/transformer. Each agent (or EV owner)
has different utility of charging at different times. Hence, at a
given time period, it is desired to charge those EVs who have
a higher utility (or less cost) for that time period. This problem
falls into the broad category of network utility maximization
problems, which can be formulated as:
min
θi∈Rd+,∀i
f(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
fi(θi) (34a)
subject to
1
N
N∑
i=1
θi  e, (34b)
θmini  θi  θmaxi , ∀i, (34c)
Θmini ≤ 1Tθi ≤ Θmaxi , ∀i, (34d)
where N × e ∈ Rd is the vector of maximum available trans-
former capacity in all time periods and  denotes component-
wise inequality between the vectors. The available capacity
changes with time of day as exogenous load on the transformer
varies with time as well. The elements {θi,j}dj=1 of the vector
θi correspond to the electricity demand of the EV i at time
slots j = 1 . . . d. The constraint (34c) restricts the amount an
EV can charge at each time slot, whereas the constraint (34d)
bounds the total amount an EV can charge. For this study, we
set the cost function to be:
fi(θ) = −
d∑
j=1
βi,j log θi,j , (35)
where βi,j are generated randomly from a uniform distribution
in [0, 1]. We study this problem under both attack scenarios
for N = 100 EVs.
1) Static impersonation attack: We simulated various static
impersonation attack scenarios and ran Algorithm 2. The
results are displayed in Figure 5.
In Figure 5a, we plot agent 70’s electricity demand for
some time periods, with |A|/N = 0.2 and α1 = 0.3. Each
different color corresponds to a different dimension of the
parameter vector (i.e., electricity demand for different time
periods). A colored solid line corresponds to a dimension of
the parameter vector iterates generated by the algorithm. A
dashed line with the same marker and color as a solid line is
the optimal value corresponding to that dimension of the pa-
rameter vector, which is the solution of the regularized robust
optimization problem (formulated as (P′υ)) of (34). Observe
that Algorithm 2 successfully provides convergence to a close
neighborhood of the optimal solution of the regularized robust
optimization problem. Furthermore, in Figure 5b we show that
the objective function value converges, as opposed to a non-
resilient PD-DRA method that is shown to oscillate and violate
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Fig. 5: Numerical study results for optimal electric vehicle charging under static impersonation attack. (a) Optimal parameter of agent 70 converges to a
neighborhood of the optimal solution of the robust optimization problem for |A|/N = 0.2 and α1 = 0.3, (b) The algorithm provides convergence of the
objective function value, (c) Mean squared error for different number of compromised channels and different choices of upper bound α1, (d) Mean squared
error when α1 = |A|/N .
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(b) p = 0.2, m = 100, α2 = 0.49
Fig. 6: Numerical study results demonstrating convergence of Algorithm 3
for optimal electric vehicle charging under two dynamic impersonation attack
scenarios: (a) p = 0.1, (b) p = 0.2. Observe that the number of iterations it
takes to converge for (b) is much larger than for (a).
the constraint in Figure 2. Our robust optimization model on
the other hand ensures there is no constraint violation.
In Figure 5c, we plot the mean squared error (MSE) in
primal variables θi for different number of compromised
channels |A| and different choices of α1, which is the upper
bound on fraction of compromised links known by the central
coordinator. The MSE is calculated by:
MSE = lim
k→∞
1
|H|
∑
i∈H
‖θ(k)i − θˆ?i ‖2, (36)
where θˆ?i is the solution to (P
′
υ) with α1 = |A|/N , i.e.,
the solution to the regularized and robustified problem with
the knowledge of the compromised channels. Naturally, the
looser the upper bound, the larger the error, since it increases
the amount of conservatism. Hence, having an accurate up-
per bound on fraction of compromised channels significantly
improves the performance.
Finally, in Figure 5d we exhibit the efficacy of our approach
with median-based mean estimation. We plot the mean squared
error in primal variables, when the upper bound on α1 is tight,
i.e., α1 = |A|/N . The error tends to increase with |A|/N ,
however, considering the magnitude, the error is negligible
and we can conclude that the median-based mean estimator
performs well.
2) Dynamic impersonation attack: We simulated a dynamic
impersonation attack scenario and ran Algorithm 3. To simu-
late a dynamic impersonation attack, we assigned a probability
Fig. 7: IEEE 9 bus system with 3 generators (supplies) represented by sources
and 8 loads (demands) represented by arrows.
p for an uplink to be compromised at each iteration3. For
p = 0.1, we picked a window size m = 20 and α2 = 0.45,
whereas for p = 0.2, we picked a window size m = 100
and α2 = 0.49. The results are displayed in Figure 6.
Each different color corresponds to a different dimension of
the parameter vector. A colored solid line corresponds to a
dimension of the parameter vector iterates generated by the
algorithm. A dashed line with the same color as a solid line
is the optimal value corresponding to that dimension of the
parameter vector, which is the solution of the regularized
optimization problem (formulated as (Pυ)) of (34).
In both scenarios, Algorithm 3 successfully provides con-
vergence to the optimal solution of the regularized problem.
Observe that for p = 0.2, we chose a larger window size
and a larger α2 in order to meet Assumption 2. However,
this restricts us to choose a smaller step size γ as dictated by
Theorem 2 and in turn slower convergence. This highlights
an important trade-off between robustness and convergence
rate, where a larger window size m and larger α2 makes the
algorithm more robust while decreasing the convergence rate.
B. Power Distribution Network
We consider the IEEE N = 9 bus system with Ng = 3
generators and N` = 8 loads as shown in Figure 7. The power
network cost minimization problem can be stated as:
min
di,gi∈R+
f(d, g) = −
N∑`
i=1
Ui(di) +
Ng∑
i=1
Ci(gi) (37a)
subject to 1T (d− g) = 0, (37b)
3Although a probabilistic scenario does not guarantee that Assumption 2
holds, with sufficiently large window size m and α2, it holds with high
probability at each iteration. Even though we do not study this scenario
theoretically, our algorithm still performs well.
11
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
107
0
50
100
150
200
(a)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
107
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
(b)
Fig. 8: Numerical study results for power network under dynamic im-
personation attack: (a)/(b) displaying convergence of the demand/supply,
respectively.
H(d− g) ≤ c, (37c)
where d = [d1 . . . dN ]T and g = [g1 . . . gN ]T are the vectors
of load and generation at each node, respectively (di = 0 for
nodes without load and gj = 0 for nodes without generators).
The first constraint (37b) ensures the power supply is equal
to the demand, and the second constraint (37c) is the power
flow constraint limiting the power flow on each branch.
Observe that the formulation in (37) does not directly match
with our general formulation in (1) mainly due to the presence
of equality constraint (37b), which prevents the application of
the robustified formulation in (9) and hence the robust PD-
DRA algorithm for static impersonation attacks. Nevertheless,
our algorithm for dynamic impersonation attacks can still be
applied since it does not require any robustified constraints
(which cannot be done for equality constraints).
We have chosen the utility function for load i to
be Ui(di) = βi log di and randomly generated βi
from a uniform distribution in [500, 1000]. For genera-
tors, we set the cost function Ci(gi) = ecigi , where
c1 = 0.01, c2 = 0.011, c3 = 0.012. We obtained the Power
Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) matrix H and the vector
of flow limits c from MATPOWER [39]. To simulate a dynamic
impersonation attack scenario, we assigned a probability p
for an uplink to be compromised at each iteration. We ran
Algorithm 3 for p = 0.15, m = 75 and α2 = 0.49.
The results are shown in Figure 8. In both Figures 8a and
8b, each different color corresponds to a different agent. A
colored solid line corresponds to an agent’s parameter iterates
generated by the algorithm. A dashed line with the same color
as a solid line is the to the optimal value of that agent’s
parameter, which is the solution of the regularized optimization
problem (formulated as (Pυ)) of (37). Our algorithm suc-
cessfully generates sequences that convergence to the optimal
solution of the regularized problem for both power supplying
and power demanding agents.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied two strategies for establishing
primal-dual algorithms for resource allocation in presence
of Byzantine attackers. Specifically, we consider static and
dynamic impersonation attack scenarios and propose an attack-
resilient primal-dual algorithm for each scenario based on
robust mean estimation techniques. We derive bounds for
the performance (in terms of distance to optimality) of the
proposed algorithms and show that our algorithm for static
impersonation attack converges to a neighborhood of the
optimal solution of the regularized and robustified resource
allocation problem, whereas our algorithm for dynamic imper-
sonation attack converges to the optimal solution of the origi-
nal regularized problem. We verify our theoretical results via
computational simulations for network utility maximization
problems involving optimal distributed resource allocation,
such as power distribution networks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Observe that in both (9) and (12), the decision variables of
the optimization problems are {θi}i∈H. Hence, it suffices to
show that any given set of {θi}i∈H satisfying constraints of
(12) also satisfies constraints of (9). Let θA := 1|A|
∑
i∈A θi.
Since gt is L-smooth, the following holds:
max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
)
= max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
gt
( |H|
N θH +
|A|
N θA)
= max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
gt
(
(1− α1)θH + (α1 − |A|N )θH + |A|N θA
)
≤ max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
(
gt
(
(1− α1)θH
)
+
〈
θ˜,∇gt
(
(1− α1)θH
)〉
+
L
2
‖θ˜‖2
)
,
(38)
where we defined θ˜ := (α1− |A|N )θH+ |A|N θA. Observe that
‖θ˜‖ ≤ (α1 − |A|N )‖θH‖+ |A|N ‖θA‖ ≤ α1R. (39)
Furthermore, since the gradient of gt is uniformly bounded by
B and α21 ≤ α1, (38) can be upper bounded by:
gt
(
(1− α1)θH
)
+ α1
(
RB + 12LR
2
)
(40)
Hence, we have shown that for any given set of {θi}i∈H, the
following holds:
max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
) ≤ gt((1−α1)θH)+α1(RB+ 12LR2).
(41)
As such defining ct := α1
(
RB+ 12LR
2
)
, it can be seen that
if a set of {θi}i∈H satisfies
gt
(
(1− α1)θH
)
+ ct ≤ 0, t = 1, ..., T, (42)
the same set of {θi}i∈H satisfies the desired constraint (9).
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Fix any j ∈ [d]. The assumption implies that for all i ∈ H,
one has:
|[xi − xH]j | ≤ r. (43)
We observe that |H| ≥ (1− α1)N . Applying [21, Lemma 1]
shows that the median estimator4 satisfies
|[xmed − xH]j | ≤ (1− α1)
√
1
1− 2α1 r. (44)
The above implies that for all i ∈ H, we have
|[xi − xmed]j | ≤
1 +√ (1− α1)2
1− 2α1
 r. (45)
This implies that rj ≤
(
1 +
√
(1−α1)2
1−2α1
)
r, since
|H| ≥ (1 − α1)N . We then bound the performance of
x̂H:
(1− α1)N [x̂H]j =
∑
i∈Nj
[xi]j
=
∑
i∈H
[xi]j −
∑
i∈H\Nj
[xi]j +
∑
i∈A∩Nj
[xi]j ,
(46)
4At each coordinate, the median is the geometric median estimator of one
dimension in [21].
thus
(1− α1)N [x̂H − xH]j
= −
∑
i∈H\Nj
[xi − xH]j +
∑
i∈A∩Nj
[xi − xH]j
= −
∑
i∈H\Nj
[xi − xH]j +
∑
i∈A∩Nj
[xi − xmed + xmed − xH]j
(47)
Notice that |A ∩ Nj | ≤ α1N and thus |H \ Nj | ≤ α1N .
Gathering terms shows
|[x̂− xH]j | ≤ 2α1N
(1− α1)N
1 +√ (1− α1)2
1− 2α1
 r. (48)
The above holds for all j ∈ [d]. Applying the norm
equivalence shows the desired bound.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Let
[
e
(k)
θ
]
i
denote the ith block of e(k)θ , and
[
ĝ
(k)
θ
]
i
denote
the ith block of ĝ(k)θ . From Equation (18a):[
ĝ
(k)
θ
]
i
=
1
N
(
ĝ
(k)
H +∇θifi(θ(k)i ) + υθ(k)i
)
. (49)
Furthermore, we replace ĝ(k)H from Algorithm 2 Step 3(c):[
ĝ
(k)
θ
]
i
=
1
N
( T∑
t=1
λ
(k)
t ∇θgt((1−α1)θ̂(k)H )+∇θifi(θ(k)i )+υθ(k)i
)
.
(50)
The perturbation
[
e
(k)
θ
]
i
=
[
ĝ
(k)
θ
]
i
− ∇θiLυ({θi}i∈H;λ;H)
is given by the difference between (50) and (14a):[
e
(k)
θ
]
i
=
1
N
T∑
t=1
λ
(k)
t
(
∇θgt((1− α1)θ̂(k)H )
− (1− α1)N|H| ∇θgt((1− α1)θ¯
(k)
H )
)
.
(51)
By adding and subtracting 1N
(∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt((1−α1)θ¯(k)H
)
,
the above expression becomes:[
e
(k)
θ
]
i
=
1
N
T∑
t=1
λ
(k)
t
(
∇θgt
(
(1− α1)θ̂(k)H
)
−∇θgt
(
(1− α1)θ(k)H
)
+
|H| − (1− α1)N
|H| ∇θgt
(
(1− α1)θ(k)H
))
(52)
Similarly, comparing (19b) with (18b) and (14b), we iden-
tify that:
[
e
(k)
λ
]
t
= gt
(
(1− α1)θ̂(k)H
)− gt((1− α1)θ(k)H ). (53)
Using Assumption 1 and the said assumptions, we imme-
diately see that
‖[e(k)θ ]i‖ ≤(1− α1)λLTN ‖θ̂(k)H − θ(k)H ‖
+
|H| − (1− α1)N
|H|
λBT
N
(54)
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which then implies (20). Assumption 1 implies that gt is B-
Lipschitz continuous, therefore
|[e(k)λ ]t| ≤ B(1− α1)‖θ̂(k)H − θ(k)H ‖, (55)
which implies (21).
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Based on Lemma 2, our idea is to perform a perturbation
analysis on the PDA algorithm. Without loss of generality, we
assume N = 1 and denote θ = θ1. To simplify notations
we define υ′ := (1 − α1)υ. We also drop the subscript,
denote the modified and regularized Lagrangian function as
L = Lυ . Furthermore, we denote the saddle point to (P′υ) as
z? = (θ?,λ?).
Using the fact that θ? = PC(θ?) = PC
(
θ?−γ∇θL(θ?,λ?)
)
,
we observe that in the primal update:
‖θ(k+1) − θ?‖2
(a)
≤ ‖θ(k) − θ?‖2 − 2γ〈ĝ(k)θ −∇θL(θ?,λ?),θ(k) − θ?〉
+ γ2‖ĝ(k)θ −∇θL(θ?,λ?)‖2 (56)
where (a) is due to the projection inequality
‖PC(x − y)‖ ≤ ‖x − y‖. Furthermore, using the Young’s
inequality, for any c0, c1 > 0, we have
‖θ(k+1) − θ?‖2
≤ ‖θ(k) − θ?‖2
− 2γ〈∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ?,λ?),θ(k) − θ?〉
+γ2(1 + c0)‖∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ?,λ?)‖2
−2γ〈e(k)θ ,θ(k) − θ?〉+ γ2
(
1 +
1
c0
)‖e(k)θ ‖2
≤ (1 + 2c1γ) ‖θ(k) − θ?‖2
− 2γ〈∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ?,λ?),θ(k) − θ?〉
+ γ2(1 + c0)‖∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ?,λ?)‖2
+
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
‖e(k)θ ‖2. (57)
Similarly, in the dual update we get,
‖λ(k+1) − λ?‖2
≤ ‖λ(k) − λ?‖2 + γ2‖ĝ(k)λ −∇λL(θ?,λ?)‖2
+ 2γ〈ĝ(k)λ −∇λL(θ?,λ?),λ(k) − λ?〉
≤ (1 + 2c1γ) ‖λ(k) − λ?‖2
+ 2γ〈∇λL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇λL(θ?,λ?),λ(k) − λ?〉
+ γ2(1 + c0)‖∇λL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇λL(θ?,λ?)‖2
+
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
‖e(k)λ ‖2. (58)
Summing up the two inequalities gives:
‖z(k+1) − z?‖2
≤ (1 + 2c1γ) ‖z(k) − z?‖2 +
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Ek
− 2γ〈Φ(z(k))−Φ(z?), z(k) − z?〉
+ γ2(1 + c0)‖Φ(z(k))−Φ(z?)‖2
(a)
≤
(
1 + 2γ(c1 − υ′) + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ
)
‖z(k) − z?‖2
+
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Ek, (59)
where (a) uses the strong monotonicity and smoothness of the
map Φ, cf. [10, Lemma 3.4]. Setting c1 = υ′/2 yields
‖z(k+1) − z?‖2
≤
(
1− γυ′ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ
)
‖z(k) − z?‖2
+
(4γ
υ′
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Ek.
(60)
Observe that we can choose γ such that
1 − γυ′ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ < 1. Moreover, the above
inequality implies that ‖z(k) − z?‖2 evaluates to
‖z(k+1) − z?‖2
≤ (1− γυ′ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ)k‖z(0) − z?‖2+
k∑
`=1
(1− γυ′ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ)k−`
(4γ
υ′
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
E`.
(61)
If Ek ≤ E for all k, then z(k) converges to a neighborhood
of z? of radius
lim sup
k→∞
‖z(k) − z?‖2 ≤
4γ
υ′ + γ
2 + γ
2
c0
γυ′ − γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ
E. (62)
Setting c0 = 1 concludes the proof.
E. Proof of Lemma 3
Comparing the equations in (27) with (26a) and (26b), we
identify that:
[
e
(k)
θ
]
j
=
1
N
T∑
t=1
λ
(k)
t
(∇θgt( 1N ∑Ni=1 θ̂(k)i )
−∇θgt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θ
(k)
i
))
,
(63)
[
e
(k)
λ
]
t
= gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θ̂
(k)
i
)− gt( 1N ∑Ni=1 θ(k)i ), (64)
where
[
e
(k)
θ
]
j
denotes the jth block of e(k)θ . Using Assump-
tion 1, we immediately see that:
‖[e(k)θ ]j‖ ≤ λLTN ‖ 1N
N∑
i=1
(θ
(k)
i − θ̂(k)i )‖
≤ λLT
N2
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖,
(65)
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which then implies (28a). Assumption 1 implies that gt is B-
Lipschitz continuous, therefore
|[e(k)λ ]t| ≤ B‖ 1N
N∑
i=1
(θ
(k)
i − θ̂(k)i )‖
≤ B
N
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖,
(66)
which implies (28b).
F. Proof of Lemma 4
Observe that the gradient perturbation in both dual and
primal variables is upper bounded by some constant times∑N
i=1 ‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖ in (28). Thus, we would like to upper
bound this term. Let H(k)i be the set of (1 − α2)m trust-
worthy parameters of agent i out of the last m parameters at
iteration k, i.e., (1 − α2)m trustworthy parameters from set
{r(k−`)i }m−1`=0 . Note that if a parameter is trustworthy, then
r
(k−`)
i = θ
(k−`)
i . Hence we define the mean of the iterates in
set H(k)i as:
θ
(k)
i :=
1
(1− α2)m
∑
θ
(k−`)
i ∈H(k)i
θ
(k−`)
i . (67)
Using triangular inequality, we can write:
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖ = ‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i + θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖
≤ ‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖+ ‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖.
(68)
Let θ̂(k)i be the estimated mean using median-based estimator.
Using norm equivalence:
max
θ
(k−`)
i ∈H(k)i
‖θ(k−`)i − θ(k)i ‖∞ ≤ max
θ
(k−`)
i ∈H(k)i
‖θ(k−`)i − θ(k)i ‖
≤ max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(k−`)i − θ(k)i ‖.
(69)
Thus, under Assumption 2, Proposition 2 suggests:
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖ ≤ Cα max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(k−`)i − θ(k)i ‖, (70)
where Cα = 2α21−α2
(
1 +
√
(1−α2)2
1−2α2
)√
d.
Let `? = arg max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(k−`)i − θ(k)i ‖. Then:
max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(k−`)i − θ(k)i ‖ = ‖θ(k−`
?)
i − θ(k)i ‖
= ‖θ(k−`?)i − θ(k−`
?+1)
i + θ
(k−`?+1)
i − . . .
− θ(k−1)i + θ(k+1)i − θ(k)i + θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖
≤ ‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖+
k−1∑
j=k−`?
‖θ(j)i − θ(j+1)i ‖
≤ ‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖+
k−1∑
j=k−`?
‖γ[ĝ(j)θ ]i‖
≤ ‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖+ γ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖[ĝ(j)θ ]i‖,
(71)
where [ĝ(j)θ ]i denotes the ith block of ĝ
(j)
θ . Using equations
(70) and (71), we can rewrite (68):
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖ ≤(1 + Cα)‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖
+ γCα
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖[ĝ(j)θ ]i‖.
(72)
Next step is to bound the ‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖ term:
‖θ(k)i − θ(k)i ‖ = ‖θ(k)i −
1
(1− α2)m
∑
θ
(k−`)
i ∈H(k)i
θ
(k−`)
i ‖
≤ 1
(1− α2)m
∑
θ
(k−`)
i ∈H(k)i
‖θ(k)i − θ(k−`)i ‖
≤ 1
(1− α2)m
m−1∑
`=0
‖θ(k)i − θ(k−`)i ‖
=
1
(1− α2)m
m−1∑
`=0
‖θ(k)i − θ(k−1)i + θ(k−1)i − . . .
− θ(k−`+1)i + θ(k−`+1)i − θ(k−`)i ‖
≤ 1
(1− α2)m
m−1∑
`=0
k−1∑
j=k−`
‖θ(j+1)i − θ(j)i ‖
≤ m
(1− α2)m
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖θ(j+1)i − θ(j)i ‖
≤ 1
1− α2 γ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖[ĝ(j)θ ]i‖.
(73)
Plugging (73) into (72):
‖θ(k)i −θ̂(k)i ‖ ≤
(
1 + Cα
1− α2 + Cα
)
γ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖[ĝ(j)θ ]i‖. (74)
For brevity of notation, let
(
1+Cα
1−α2 + Cα
)
= Cα and let
∇θL(k)υ := ∇θLυ(θ(k);λ(k)). Summing up (74) for all agents
and using norm equivalence:
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖ ≤ Cα
√
Nγ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖ĝ(j)θ ‖
(27a)
= Cα
√
Nγ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖∇θL(j)υ + e(j)θ ‖
≤ Cα
√
Nγ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖∇θL(j)υ ‖+ ‖e(j)θ ‖.
(75)
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Using (28a):
‖e(j)θ ‖ ≤
λLT
N
N∑
i=1
‖θ(j)i − θ̂(j)i ‖
=
λLT
N
N∑
i=1
‖θ(j)i − θ?i + θ?i − θ̂(j)i ‖
≤ λLT
N
N∑
i=1
‖θ(j)i − θ?i ‖+ ‖θ̂(j)i − θ?i ‖
(∗)
≤ (1 +
√
d)
λLT
N
N∑
i=1
max
0≤`i≤m−1
‖θ(j−`i)i − θ?i ‖
≤ (1 +
√
d)λLT max
i
0≤`i≤m−1
‖θ(j−`i)i − θ?i ‖
≤ (1 +
√
d)λLT max
0≤`≤m−1
‖z(j−`) − z?‖,
(76)
where (∗) is obtained by:
‖θ̂(j)i − θ?i ‖ ≤
√
d‖θ̂(j)i − θ?i ‖∞
≤
√
d max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(j−`)i − θ?i ‖∞
≤
√
d max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(j−`)i − θ?i ‖,
(77)
and ‖θ(j)i − θ?i ‖ ≤ max
0≤`≤m−1
‖θ(j−`)i − θ?i ‖.
Furthermore, by using the LΦ-Lipschitz property of Φ(z):
‖∇θL(j)υ ‖ ≤ ‖Φ(z(j))‖ = ‖Φ(z(j))−Φ(z?)‖
≤ 1
LΦ
‖z(j) − z?‖
≤ 1
LΦ
max
0≤`≤m−1
‖z(j−`) − z?‖
(78)
We can rewrite (75) using equations (76) and (78):
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖ ≤ Cα
√
Nγ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
‖∇θL(j)υ ‖+ ‖e(j)θ ‖
≤ Cα
√
NC0γ
k−1∑
j=k−m+1
max
0≤`≤m−1
‖z(j−`) − z?‖
≤ Cα
√
NC0(m− 1)γ max
1≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖,
(79)
where C0 = 1LΦ +(1+
√
d)λLT . Finally, using (28) and letting
C1 =
(
λLT
N
)2
+
(
BT
N
)2
:
Ek = ‖e(k)θ ‖2 + ‖e(k)λ ‖2 ≤ C1
(
N∑
i=1
‖θ(k)i − θ̂(k)i ‖
)2
≤ C1(Cα
√
NC0(m− 1))2γ2 max
1≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖2
≤ C1(Cα
√
NC0(m− 1))2γ2 max
0≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖2
≤ Cγ2 max
0≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖2,
(80)
where C =
(
T 2(λ
2
L2+B2)
N
)
×
(
1
LΦ
+ (1 +
√
d)λLT
)2
×(
1+Cα
1−α2 + Cα
)2
× (m− 1)2.
G. Proof of Theorem 2
Based on Lemma 3, our idea is to perform a perturbation
analysis on the PDA algorithm. The first part of the proof is
analogous to that of Theorem 1, and then upper bounding Ek
by Lemma 4. This yields:
‖z(k+1) − z?‖ ≤ (1− γυ + 2γ2L2Φ)‖z(k) − z?‖2
+
(
4γ
υ
+ 2γ2
)
γ2C max
0≤`≤2(m−1)
‖z(k−`) − z?‖2. (81)
For the second part of the proof, we use the following
Lemma:
Lemma 5. [40, Lemma 3] Let {V (t)} be a sequence of real
numbers satisfying
V (t+ 1) ≤ pV (t) + q max
t−τ(t)≤s≤t
V (s) + r, t ∈ N0,
for some nonnegative constants p,q, and r. If p+ q < 1 and
0 ≤ τ(t) ≤ τmax, t ∈ N0,
then
V (t) ≤ ρtV (0) + , t ∈ N0,
where ρ = (p+ q)
1
1+τmax and  = r/(1− p− q).
We apply Lemma 5 on (81) for t = k ≥ 2(m − 1),
V (t) = V (k) = ‖z(k) − z?‖2, p = 1 − γυ + 2γ2L2Φ,
q =
(
4γ
υ + 2γ
2
)
γ2C, r = 0, and τmax = 2(m− 1) to get:
V (k) ≤ ρk−2(m−1)V (2(m− 1)), k ≥ 2(m− 1), (82)
where ρ = (1 − γυ + 2γ2L2Φ + 4Cγ
3
υ + 2Cγ
4)
1
1+2(m−1) . The
condition p+ q < 1 is met when:
f(γ) = υ − 2γL2Φ −
4Cγ2
υ
− 2Cγ3 > 0
Observe that f(γ) is a continuous function in γ, and
f(0) = υ > 0. Hence, there exists a small γ > 0 such that
f(γ) > 0, which satisfies the required condition. Taking the
limit as k goes to infinity in (82):
lim
k→∞
V (k) ≤ lim
k→∞
ρk−2(m−1)V (2(m− 1)) = 0, (83)
since ρ < 1. Finally, since V (k) ≥ 0, we conclude that
lim
k→∞
V (k) = lim
k→∞
‖z(k) − z?‖2 = 0.
H. Proof of Bounded Dual Variables
The proof is the same for statements in both Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3. The update rule given by (18b):
λ
(k+1)
t =
[
λ
(k)
t + γ
(
gt((1− α1)θ̂(k)H )− υλ(k)t
)]
+
. (84)
The update rule given by (26b):
λ
(k+1)
t =
[
λ
(k)
t + γ
(
gt(θ̂
(k))− υλ(k)t
)]
+
. (85)
Let gt(·) ≤M and 0 ≤ λ(k)t ≤ Mυ . We can upper bound both
(84) and (85) as:
λ
(k+1)
t ≤ (1− γυ)λ(k)t + γM ≤
M
υ
. (86)
Hence, one can set λ(0)t ≤ Mυ to guarantee assumption.
Anyhow if Mυ ≤ λ(k)t :
λ
(k+1)
t ≤ (1− γυ)λ(k)t + γM ≤ λ(k)t . (87)
Thus, if λ(0)t ≤ Mυ then λ = Mυ . If λ(0)t ≥ Mυ then λ = λ(0)t .
This guarantees the assumption.
